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Introduction 
Governance mechanisms are deeply embedded in the surrounding legal and economic context. 
First, corporate governance designs evolve over time as the institutional environment is 
reshaped. Many institutional reforms initiated by regulators have far-reaching implications 
for the governance of public firms. The examples in the US include the erection of a wide 
variety of anti-takeover defences since the late 1980s, the amended proxy rules introduced in 
the early 1990s, the adoption of the “Fair Disclosure” regulation in 2000, and the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, undoubtedly the most comprehensive corporate governance 
reform program in the US since the 1930s. Second, corporate governance designs are 
characterized by considerable cross-sectional variations because of different institutional 
contexts. Just as no single political constitution is universally adopted by all nations, no 
unique set of governance rules can be applied to different corporations and economies all 
over the world. An important stream of the literature, known as the comparative corporate 
governance literature, has proliferated, aiming at exploiting the rich diversity of corporate 
governance mechanisms across countries, and comparing their strengths and weaknesses. 
Having embraced the idea that corporate governance and the institutional context tend to be 
intertwined, I demonstrate in this dissertation how (i) boards of directors have responded to 
regulatory reforms and escalated public scrutiny since the early 2000s (Chapters 2 and 3) and 
(ii) the incidences of financial fraud committed by cross-listed firms, the spillover effect, and 
the moderating role of reputable auditors are related to their home countries’ corporate 
governance levels (Chapter 4).  
My investigation into the market for independent directors yields interesting findings: despite 
the unambiguous increase in the demand for independent directors since 2000 because of new 
governance reforms, independent directors have reduced their board seats since then as a 
response to the increased workload and risk. The important questions that have not been 
addressed so far, however, are what type of firms these directors depart from, to what extent 
these departure decisions are period-specific, and how the gap between increased demand and 
decreased supply is filled. In adjusting their directorship portfolio, incumbent directors are 
more likely to depart firms that are costly to monitor and advise during the period when 
public scrutiny is high, while this finding is not observed during the low-scrutiny period. 
Despite shrinking supply from the incumbent director pool, a substantial number of new 
directors enter the market to satisfy demand. These new directors are more likely to be 
financial experts (audit committee member) and are more likely to be recruited by firms that 
are costly to monitor and advise, results which are again specific to the high-scrutiny period. 
These findings suggest that, although it is never a purpose of the governance reforms, firms 
that have higher monitoring/advising cost tend to lose incumbent directors and have to recruit 
unseasoned new directors instead.  
Having examined how the market for independent directors evolves as the institutional 
environment is reshaped; I shift my focus on comparative corporate governance research. 
More specifically, using data on shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the US, I 
investigate financial misconducts of US-listed foreign firms. After controlling for type I 
errors (e.g. frivolous lawsuits), I document that firms domiciled in the countries with weak 
corporate governance were more likely to commit fraud, but such relation could be 
moderated by the presence of Big 4 auditors. Investors automatically adjusted for type II 
errors (e.g. undiscovered fraud) when valuating the stocks of non-sued firms. That is, non-
sued firms that shared the same countries of origin with their sued peers experienced 
valuation declines around class periods end dates (the dates when the scandals were exposed 
rather than the dates when the litigations were filed). Investors relied on audit quality to form 
their expectations about the severity of type II errors, and thus posed less negative spillovers 
on firms with Big 4 auditors, especially when the firms were from countries with weak 
corporate governance. Taken together, my results suggest that a listing on US exchanges does 
not fully compensate weak local institutions; voluntarily bonding to more stringent audit 
process has an incremental effect on protecting shareholder interests, and enhances the 
confidence of investors in firms’ financial integrity. 
 
  
